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II.-217 
U.S. CITIZENS DETAINED AND DEPORTED? 
A TEST OF THE GREAT WRIT’S REACH IN 
PROTECTING DUE PROCESS RIGHTS  
IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 
Abstract: Every year, the U.S. government unlawfully detains a significant 
number of U.S. citizens and places them in immigration removal proceedings. 
Before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s 2018 decision 
in Gonzalez-Alarcon v. Macias, four circuits had held that an individual in re-
moval proceedings with a valid claim to U.S. citizenship need not exhaust ad-
ministrative remedies before the claim could be subject to judicial review. With 
its decision in Gonzalez-Alarcon, the Tenth Circuit joined the majority of cir-
cuits that have ruled on this issue and asserted the right of such an individual to 
bring a habeas corpus petition in federal court to resolve the citizenship question 
prior to exhausting administrative remedies. This Comment analyzes the situa-
tion that the plaintiff in Gonzalez-Alarcon presented when he discovered that he 
had a valid claim to U.S. citizenship after having been removed several times. 
Further, this Comment explores the ways in which the Tenth Circuit’s decision 
solidifies the importance of the writ of habeas corpus in challenging executive 
detention and affirms the power of judicial intervention to protect individual 
rights in an immigration system governed by plenary power. 
INTRODUCTION 
Images of overcrowded immigration detention centers and debates about 
borders and belonging flood today’s media.1 Beneath those evocative head-
lines, however, lurks a quieter procedural beast.2 Removal proceedings are 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See, e.g., David A. Graham, Are Children Being Kept in ‘Cages’ at the Border?, THE ATLAN-
TIC (Jun. 18, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06/ceci-nest-pas-une-cage/
563072/ [https://perma.cc/Y7SX-NBA5] (reporting that hundreds of immigrant children along the 
southern border are being detained in metal chain-link pens as they await processing); Molly Hen-
nessy-Fiske & Cindy Carcamo, Overcrowded, Unsanitary Conditions Seen at Immigrant Detention 
Centers, L.A. TIMES (Jun. 18, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-texas-
immigrant-children-20140618-story.html [https://perma.cc/M59M-AAYL] (arguing dirty facilities 
and overcrowded cells reflect a lack of preparation for an influx of immigrants at the border); Kevin 
Sieff, U.S. Is Denying Passports to Americans Along the Border, Throwing Their Citizenship into 
Question, WASH. POST (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/us-is-
denying-passports-to-americans-along-the-border-throwing-their-citizenship-into-question/2018/
08/29/1d630e84-a0da-11e8-a3dd-2a1991f075d5_story.html [https://perma.cc/DMK7-937G] (detail-
ing one account, among many, of the State Department’s denial of a passport to a Hispanic individual 
with an official U.S. birth certificate). 
 2 See Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to 
Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
II.-218 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:E. Supp. 
considered civil, and thus do not afford immigrant detainees the same proce-
dural protections available to the criminally accused.3 As a consequence, each 
year immigration authorities wrongfully detain a sizable number of U.S. citi-
zens, many of whom are foreign-born.4 Abraham Gonzalez-Alarcon fit the 
precise profile of those most vulnerable to such unlawful detention.5 Born in 
Mexico, just south of the U.S. border, Gonzalez-Alarcon discovered that he 
had a viable claim to derivative U.S. citizenship only after having been de-
tained and removed from the United States several times.6 When he finally 
asserted this claim, however, he initially faced rejection on procedural 
grounds, namely, failure to exhaust available administrative remedies.7 Then, 
Gonzalez-Alarcon faced an uncertain and unusual appeal.8 
                                                                                                                           
289, 293 (2008) (explaining that because the Supreme Court has classified removal proceedings as 
civil, the full range of procedural rights guaranteed to those in criminal proceedings do not extend 
to noncitizens facing deportation). 
 3 Id.; see Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (asserting that deporta-
tion is not criminal punishment and thus does not implicate a deprivation of liberty). 
 4 See AARTI KOHLI ET AL., THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. OF LAW & SOC. POLI-
CY, UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY SCH. OF LAW, SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS: AN 
ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE PROCESS 4 (2011) (reporting that approximately 3,600, 
or 1.6%, of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainees from 2008 to 2011 were U.S. 
citizens). Although the precise number of U.S. citizens detained by immigration authorities is 
unknown, some studies estimate an even higher percentage. See Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Gov-
ernment Unlawfully Detaining and Deporting U.S. Citizens as Aliens, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 
606, 629, 632 & n.75 (2011) (estimating that between 1% and 8% of ICE detainees in specific 
states studied were U.S. citizens). Given that an estimated 390,000 individuals are detained each 
year, this could reasonably place the number of U.S. citizens detained annually by ICE between 
3,900 and 31,200. See Kari E. Hong, Removing Citizens: Parenthood, Immigration Courts, and 
Derivative Citizenship, 28 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 277, 312 (2014) (explaining that in 2010, the annual 
detainee population had grown to 390,000, an increase from 95,000 just nine years earlier). Re-
cently, the number of people detained by ICE each year has exceeded 400,000. T. ALEXANDER 
ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP PROCESS AND POLICY 242 (8th ed. 2016). 
 5 See Gonzalez-Alarcon v. Macias, 884 F.3d 1266, 1269 (10th Cir. 2018) (explaining that 
Gonzalez-Alarcon is foreign-born and claimed U.S. citizenship based on his mother’s birth in the 
United States); Jacqueline Stevens, The Alien Who Is a Citizen, in CITIZENSHIP IN QUESTION: EVI-
DENTIARY BIRTHRIGHT AND STATELESSNESS 217, 227 (Benjamin N. Lawrence & Jacqueline Ste-
vens eds., 2017) (explaining that citizens who wrongfully land in deportation proceedings are typical-
ly U.S. citizens either as a result of their birth in the United States or because they have gained citi-
zenship automatically by descent, rather than by a formal naturalization process); Charles J. Ogletree, 
Jr., America’s Schizophrenic Immigration Policy: Race, Class, and Reason, 41 B.C. L. REV. 755, 
767–69 (2000) (revealing that Latinos, as compared with other racial groups, are statistically dispro-
portionate targets of deportation in the United States). 
 6 Gonzalez-Alarcon, 884 F.3d at 1269. The foreign-born child of a U.S. citizen can claim 
derivative citizenship by birthright if one or both of the citizen-parents fulfill particular statutory 
requirements. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401–1409 (2018); see Hong, supra note 4, at 282 n.3 (discussing statu-
tory requirements such as residency in the United States, legitimacy of the child, and date of the 
parents’ naturalization). 
 7 Gonzalez Alarcon v. Marcias, No. 15-CV-00910 MV/LF, 2016 WL 9777258, at *1 (D.N.M. 
Sept. 29, 2016), vacated, 884 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2018). 
 8 Gonzalez-Alarcon, 884 F.3d at 1275–76. 
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Part I of this Comment discusses the current U.S. immigration appeals 
process and explains how federal courts have interpreted the REAL ID Act’s 
statutory administrative exhaustion requirement in the context of U.S. citizen-
ship claims.9 Part I also provides the facts of Gonzalez-Alarcon’s case and 
outlines the ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
in Gonzalez-Alarcon v. Macias.10 Part II delves deeper into the reasoning be-
hind the Tenth Circuit’s holding that the REAL ID Act’s exhaustion require-
ment does not apply to individuals claiming U.S. citizenship in the context of 
a removal proceeding.11 Further, Part II explores the logic isolating the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit as the sole contrarian in a five-
to-one circuit split over the need to exhaust administrative remedies.12 Final-
ly, Part III argues that the Gonzalez-Alarcon holding lessens the likelihood of 
prolonged unlawful detention of U.S. citizens by providing more efficient 
access to judicial intervention.13 
I. U.S. CITIZENSHIP CLAIMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXHAUSTION  
AS REQUIRED BY FEDERAL COURTS 
The administrative law doctrine requiring parties to exhaust administra-
tive remedies prior to judicial review promotes both judicial efficiency and 
agency autonomy.14 For individuals in the U.S. immigration system—many 
of whom are detained pending exhaustion—this process can be lengthy and 
complex.15 Section A of this Part introduces the U.S. immigration appeals 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See infra notes 14–57 and accompanying text. The REAL ID Act, enacted by Congress in 
2005, was part of a broad response to perceived national threats, including terrorism. Jay M. 
Zitter, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 11 A.L.R. Fed. 2d Art. 1 (2018). The provisions relevant to this Comment, 
codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252, aimed to increase border security and tighten procedures for removal 
of noncitizens. See id. (explaining that the REAL ID Act was part of the much larger Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief). 
For example, § 1252(d)(1) requires a noncitizen facing removal to exhaust administrative reme-
dies before seeking judicial review in federal court. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). 
 10 See infra notes 58–75 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 76–97 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 98–107 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 108–125 and accompanying text. 
 14 See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992) (“Exhaustion is required because it 
serves the twin purposes of protecting administrative agency authority and promoting judicial 
efficiency.”). The exhaustion doctrine ensures that agencies, rather than courts, have authority 
over that which Congress has delegated to them, and that agencies can self-correct and develop 
informative records for potential judicial review. Id. 
 15 See, e.g., Camila Domonoske, U.S. Citizen Who Was Held by ICE for 3 Years Denied Com-
pensation by Appeals Court, NPR (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/
08/01/540903038/u-s-citizen-held-by-immigration-for-3-years-denied-compensation-by-appeals-
court [https://perma.cc/6BBM-Q6T3] (detailing the account of Davino Watson, a Jamaican-born 
U.S. citizen, who spent nearly three and a half years in detention while attempting to prove his 
II.-220 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:E. Supp. 
process and explains the jurisdictional impact of the 2005 REAL ID Act.16 
Section A further examines how federal courts have interpreted the adminis-
trative exhaustion requirement as applied to individuals in removal proceed-
ings claiming U.S. citizenship.17 Section B discusses Gonzalez-Alarcon’s 
case and provides an overview of the Tenth Circuit’s decision.18 
A. The REAL ID Act’s Impact on the Immigration Appeals Process and 
 the Judiciary’s Interpretation of the Administrative Exhaustion  
Requirement for U.S. Citizenship Claims 
In the immigration context, Congress and the executive branch have 
“plenary power,” which enables them to regulate the influx of immigrants 
without substantial intervention from the judicial branch.19 Immigration 
courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) fall under the execu-
tive branch, as part of the Department of Justice.20 For a noncitizen faced 
with a removal order, initial removal proceedings occur before an administra-
                                                                                                                           
citizenship). An attorney on Mr. Watson’s case, Mary Meg McCarthy described the U.S. immigra-
tion system as “bureaucratic and very, very complicated to navigate . . . very Kafka-esque.” Id. 
 16 See infra notes 19–39 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 40–57 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 58–75 and accompanying text. 
 19 See Kevin R. Johnson, Chae Chan Ping v. United States: 125 Years of Immigration’s Ple-
nary Power Doctrine, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 57, 58 n.1 (2015) (explaining that the notion of plenary 
power as a means of protecting immigration decisions from judicial review was first introduced by 
the Supreme Court in 1889 in Chae Chan Ping v. United States with respect to Chinese exclusion 
laws). In Chae Chan Ping, the Court affirmed the validity of a congressional act prohibiting cer-
tain Chinese laborers from entering the United States, amid a growing tide of prejudice toward 
Chinese immigrants. See 130 U.S. 581, 595, 609, 611 (1889) (detailing the restrictions and preju-
dice, and noting specifically “[a]s [Chinese immigrants] grew in numbers each year the people of 
the coast saw . . . great danger that at no distant day that portion of our country would be overrun 
by them unless prompt action was taken to restrict their immigration”); see also Harisiades v. 
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588–89 (1952) (“[A]ny policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately 
interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war 
power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government. Such matters are so exclusively 
entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or 
interference.”); Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 705, 707 (asserting authority of political branches to 
admit and exclude noncitizens and characterizing such authority as intrinsic to national sovereign-
ty); LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS 52–53 (1995) (detailing the authority granted to 
Congress in Fong Yue Ting to remove noncitizens if “necessary or expedient for the public inter-
est”). 
 20 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2018). The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) consists of up to 
twenty-one attorneys appointed by the Attorney General and provides appellate review of immi-
gration court decisions. Id. Located in Falls Church, Virginia, the BIA has nationwide jurisdiction 
to hear immigration cases, and its decisions are binding unless overturned by the Attorney General 
or a federal court. Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Sept. 28, 2018), https://
www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals [https://perma.cc/TB9R-CMAA]. Unlike feder-
al appellate courts, the BIA rarely hears oral arguments; instead, its modus operandi is to conduct 
a paper review of appealed immigration cases. Id. 
2019] Judicial Review of Immigration Detention of U.S. Citizens II.-221 
tive immigration court judge.21 An appeal of this decision can be filed with 
the BIA, which is the highest level of administrative review for immigration 
matters.22 A noncitizen seeking further review must file an appeal in federal 
court.23 
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), enacted by Congress in 
1952 and amended several times since, is the cornerstone of U.S. immigration 
law and policy.24 Before 1952, the only means through which a noncitizen 
could challenge the legality of a removal order was by filing a habeas corpus 
petition in federal district court.25 Historically, the writ of habeas corpus, or 
the “Great Writ,” has been a powerful mechanism for challenging executive 
detention.26 The consolidation of immigration law into the INA, along with 
subsequent amendments, however, disrupted the simplicity of the process for 
appealing removal orders.27 
Among the most significant amendments to the INA has been the REAL 
ID Act of 2005, which effected sweeping changes to immigration law in the 
wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks.28 The REAL ID Act impacts section 
                                                                                                                           
 21 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1(a) (2018). U.S. immigration law defines the term “alien” as “any person 
not a citizen or national of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2018). To avoid furthering the 
use of this dehumanizing designation, this Comment instead uses the term “noncitizen,” except 
where quoting relevant portions of U.S. immigration law. 
 22 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b). 
 23 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). For an in-depth view of relevant immigration removal proceedings 
from initial apprehension of a noncitizen to removal from the United States, see John Gavin, Note, 
Finally Freed or Infinitely Detained? The Need for a Clear Standard of Finality for Reinstated 
Orders of Removal, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2437, 2445–51 (2018).  
 24 See generally 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (codifying the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA”) in Title Eight of the U.S. Code); Public Laws Amending the INA, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & 
IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/PUBLAW/HTML/PUBLAW/0-0-0-
1.html (last updated May 2013) [https://perma.cc/L6KK-MX28] (detailing the various amend-
ments enacted since the INA’s 1952 inception).  
 25 Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 306 (2001). 
 26 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive 
Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2032 (2007) (explaining that the “Great 
Writ” of habeas corpus has enabled courts to ensure that “neither the King, the President, nor any 
other executive official may impose detention except as authorized by law”). 
 27 See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 296 n.26 (citing Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955)) 
(explaining that after 1952, declaratory judgment actions brought in federal district court could 
also bring about judicial review of deportation orders). In 1961, Congress introduced Section 106 
to the INA, which consolidated review of removal orders in the appeals courts and took it away 
from the district courts. Id. (citing Foti v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 375 U.S. 217 
(1963)); Daniel Kanstroom, The Long, Complex, and Futile Deportation Saga of Carlos Marcello, 
in IMMIGRATION STORIES 113, 137 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005) (explaining 
that Section 106 of the INA drastically altered procedures for judicial review to minimize delay 
and simplify proceedings). 
 28 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–13, 119 Stat. 231. Responding to increased anti-
immigrant sentiment after September 11, 2001, the REAL ID Act aimed to curb illegal immigra-
tion by introducing a national ID card system and increasing border security. Jamie Nelson, Note, 
Locking Down Our Borders: How Anti-immigration Sentiment Led to Unconstitutional Legislation 
II.-222 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:E. Supp. 
242 of the INA, which governs judicial review of removal orders.29 One of 
the amendments eliminated the availability of habeas corpus relief in district 
court to challenge removal orders issued by the BIA.30 The REAL ID Act 
ordained that the “sole and exclusive” method for judicial review of a remov-
al order is through a petition for review filed with the appropriate federal cir-
cuit court of appeals.31 
Further, the REAL ID Act mandated that an appeals court may only re-
view a final removal order after the noncitizen has exhausted all available 
administrative remedies.32 Exhaustion is generally fulfilled when an issue is 
brought before the BIA, but may also require a noncitizen to file motions to 
reconsider or reopen, depending on the statutory provisions governing the 
issue.33 With respect to claims of U.S. citizenship as grounds for rebuttal of a 
removal order, many circuits have waived the standard exhaustion require-
ment and concluded that non-frivolous claims to citizenship merit judicial 
review.34 
                                                                                                                           
and the Erosion of Fundamental Principles of American Government, 18 J.L. & POL’Y 459, 459 
(2009). In the same vein, the REAL ID Act sought to tighten immigration removal procedures by 
eliminating the availability of habeas corpus review of removal orders and greatly expanding 
appeals court jurisdiction. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 4, at 1045, 1055. 
 29 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). Section 242 of the INA is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252. 1 BENDER’S 
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT SERVICE § 242 (8 U.S.C. 1252) (2018). 
 30 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). The REAL ID Act was not the first congressional attempt to stream-
line judicial review. See Kanstroom, supra note 27, at 137–38 (explaining that in 1996, Congress 
passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) and the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) in an effort to eliminate judicial review of 
certain immigration decisions). In 2001, however, the Supreme Court concluded in St. Cyr that 
preventing judicial review in removal proceedings implicated Suspension Clause issues, and thus 
held that the 1996 amendments did not preclude habeas jurisdiction to consider questions of law. 
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 314; Kanstroom, supra note 27, at 137–38. The REAL ID Act’s jurisdiction-
limiting provision was largely inspired by congressional dissatisfaction with the Court’s holding in 
St. Cyr. See Enwonwu v. Chertoff, 376 F. Supp. 2d 42, 82 (D. Mass. 2005) (explaining that Con-
gress’s introduction of Section 106 to the INA largely responded to discontent with St. Cyr and the 
belief that the Court’s holding could enable noncitizens with a criminal history to delay their re-
moval for years); see also Iasu v. Smith, 511 F.3d 881, 886 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he REAL ID Act 
responded to St. Cyr by eliminating all district court habeas jurisdiction over orders of removal.”). 
 31 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5); see St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 311–12 (explaining that historically, in the 
immigration context, “judicial review” and “habeas corpus” have differed primarily in their scope 
of inquiry, with habeas corpus limited to due process concerns); Omolo v. Gonzales, 452 F.3d 
404, 407 (5th Cir. 2006) (explaining that the REAL ID Act instructed district courts to transfer all 
pending habeas petitions challenging final orders of removal to the appropriate courts of appeals to 
be addressed as if presented for the first time in a petition for review). 
 32 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (“A court may review a final order of removal only if the alien has 
exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right . . . .”); see id. § 1101(a)(3) 
(defining the term “alien” as “any person not a citizen or national of the United States”). 
 33 8 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 104.02 (2018). 
 34 Poole v. Mukasey, 522 F.3d 259, 261, 264 (2d Cir. 2008); Omolo, 452 F.3d at 406–07; 
Minasyan v. Gonzales, 401 F.3d 1069, 1074–76 (9th Cir. 2005); Moussa v. Immigration & Natu-
ralization Serv., 302 F.3d 823, 824–25, 827 (8th Cir. 2002); see infra notes 42–51 and accompa-
2019] Judicial Review of Immigration Detention of U.S. Citizens II.-223 
In 1922, in Ng Fung Ho v. White, the Supreme Court held that the Fifth 
Amendment guarantees judicial evaluation of non-frivolous claims to U.S. 
citizenship because the deportation of an individual with a valid citizenship 
claim would yield an unconstitutional loss.35 In the same vein, the Court as-
serted that the executive branch lacks the authority to deport U.S. citizens.36 
Under U.S. immigration law, however, the line between citizen and nonciti-
zen is far from cut-and-dry, and not all claims to citizenship are equal.37 For 
instance, in removal proceedings, for people claiming birth in the United 
States, the government assumes the burden of disproving U.S. citizenship; 
however, for foreign-born people claiming citizenship, the respondent bears 
the burden of proving U.S. citizenship.38 A statutory directive that such 
claims must be administratively exhausted prior to judicial review could 
compound this already heavy burden on some respondents.39 
                                                                                                                           
nying text (discussing cases in which the circuit courts ruled that the exhaustion requirement under 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(d) does not apply to people with non-frivolous U.S. citizenship claims). To de-
termine whether a claim to citizenship is frivolous, courts assess whether the claim is statutorily 
valid. See, e.g., Minasyan, 401 F.3d at 1074–76 (holding that the plaintiff’s claim was not frivo-
lous because it clearly met the statutory requirements of a derivative citizenship claim under for-
mer 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)); Taniguchi v. Schultz, 303 F.3d 950, 953–55 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that 
the plaintiff’s citizenship claim was frivolous where she was a native citizen of the Philippines, 
had been convicted for impersonating a U.S. citizen, and based her claim solely on the fact that 
she had filed an N-600 Application for Certificate of Citizenship); see also Rivera v. Ashcroft, 394 
F.3d 1129, 1138 (9th Cir. 2004) (distinguishing Taniguchi and explaining that in that case, the peti-
tioner’s U.S. citizenship claim was “patently frivolous”). 
 35 Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284–85 (1922). Indeed, Justice Brandeis did not over-
state the potentially grave implications of deportation, for citizens and noncitizens alike. See id. at 
284 (asserting that deportation of an individual who claims to be a U.S. citizen “may result . . . in 
loss of both property and life, or of all that makes life worth living”). More recently, the Court has 
also characterized deportation as “the equivalent of banishment or exile.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 
U.S. 356, 373 (2010); see Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
1299, 1301–02 (2011) (explaining that deportation can send individuals to unfamiliar countries 
where they lack familial support in the face of language barriers, persecution, or even death). 
 36 Ng Fung Ho, 259 U.S. at 284; see Rachel E. Rosenbloom, The Citizenship Line: Rethinking 
Immigration Exceptionalism, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1965, 2000 (2013) (explaining that in Ng Fung Ho, 
the Court finally acknowledged a doctrine of citizenship exceptionalism and formally established 
that “citizenship claims should be set apart from the rest of immigration law”). 
 37 See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359 n.1 (explaining that, although U.S. citizens are not deportable, 
the law that grants derivative citizenship is complex, relying on a variety of factors including the 
immigration laws in place at the time of the child’s birth and the marital status of the child’s citi-
zen parent). 
 38 See Stevens, supra note 4, at 637–38, 638 n.111 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c) (2006)) (ex-
plaining that in deportation proceedings, “the alien has the burden of establishing . . . by clear and 
convincing evidence, that the alien is lawfully present in the United States pursuant to a prior 
admission”); see also Polly J. Price, Jus Soli and Statelessness: A Comparative Perspective from the 
Americas, in CITIZENSHIP IN QUESTION: EVIDENTIARY BIRTHRIGHT AND STATELESSNESS, supra 
note 5, at 27, 36 (explaining that a petitioner’s lack of proof of citizenship is often a major factor in 
wrongful removals of U.S. citizens). 
 39 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (“A court may review a final order of removal only if the alien has 
exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right . . . .”). 
II.-224 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:E. Supp. 
Several circuit courts, however, have addressed the issue of whether an 
individual in removal proceedings claiming U.S. citizenship must exhaust 
administrative remedies before the claim can be subject to judicial review.40 
The majority of circuits that have ruled on this issue have interpreted the ex-
haustion requirement under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d) as applying only to “aliens,” 
and not to people with non-frivolous U.S. citizenship claims.41 
For example, in 2005, in Minasyan v. Gonzales, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a previously deported Armenian 
native claiming U.S. citizenship did not need to exhaust his administrative 
remedies before the court could review his final order of removal.42 If courts 
required such exhaustion, the court reasoned that an individual could inad-
vertently relinquish his or her U.S. citizenship.43 In that case, the Ninth Cir-
cuit determined that the plaintiff’s non-frivolous citizenship claim entitled 
him to a judicial determination of that claim despite his failure to exhaust 
available administrative remedies.44 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has applied a 
textual interpretation of § 1252(d) and observed that the statute’s exhaustion 
provision does not apply to “any person” seeking to challenge a final removal 
order, but only to an “alien.”45 In 2002, in Moussa v. Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service, the court reasoned that it had jurisdiction to review the 
final removal order of an Ethiopian-born plaintiff claiming U.S. citizenship 
prior to administrative exhaustion because the court needed to first determine 
                                                                                                                           
 40 Johnson v. Whitehead, 647 F.3d 120, 125 (4th Cir. 2011); Poole, 522 F.3d at 261, 264; 
Omolo, 452 F.3d at 406–07; Theagene v. Gonzales, 411 F.3d 1107, 1110 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2005); 
Minasyan, 401 F.3d at 1074–76; Moussa, 302 F.3d at 824–25, 827; see infra notes 42–57 and 
accompanying text (discussing the circuit courts that have addressed the exhaustion requirement in 
the context of removal proceedings). 
 41 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Poole, 522 F.3d at 261, 264; Omolo, 452 F.3d at 406–07; Theagene, 
411 F.3d at 1110 & n.4; Minasyan, 401 F.3d at 1074–76; Moussa, 302 F.3d at 824–25, 827; see 
infra notes 42–51 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which the circuit courts ruled that 
the exhaustion requirement under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d) does not apply to people with non-frivolous 
U.S. citizenship claims). But see Johnson, 647 F.3d at 125 (holding the plaintiff’s habeas corpus 
petition was barred because he had failed to exhaust administrative remedies before filing in the 
district court). 
 42 Minasyan, 401 F.3d at 1072, 1075. 
 43 Id. at 1075. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Moussa, 302 F.3d at 825; see also Theagene, 411 F.3d at 1110 & n.4 (“[T]he plain lan-
guage of the statute specifies that only an alien may be required to exhaust remedies.”). But see 
Theagene, 411 F.3d at 1115–16 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (addressing potential for overburdening 
of judicial branch in adjudicating immigration cases by arguing “Moussa [on which the Theagene 
majority relies] does not stand for the proposition that one may litigate his case on the merits be-
fore the IJ and BIA, expressly conceding that he is an alien, but then relitigate his claims in the 
court of appeals on the contradictory basis that he is a citizen”). 
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the validity of his citizenship claim before deciding whether § 1252(d) even 
applied to him.46 
Similarly, in 2006, in Omolo v. Gonzales, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that courts always have jurisdiction to 
determine their own jurisdiction.47 Acknowledging that it may only review a 
final removal order when the “alien” has exhausted administrative remedies, 
the court held that it first must determine whether the Kenyan-born plaintiff 
was, indeed, an “alien.”48 Thus, the court granted her habeas petition.49 
Echoing the circuits above, in 2008 the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit in Poole v. Mukasey found no “jurisdictional obstacle” 
to a Guyanese-born plaintiff’s citizenship claim for failure to exhaust.50 Alt-
hough the court dismissed all other aspects of the plaintiff’s petition for re-
view of a removal order for failure to exhaust, it concluded that his citizen-
ship claim was distinct, given that such an assertion would act as a jurisdic-
tional bar in a removal proceeding.51 
The only circuit to require exhaustion of a citizenship claim is the Unit-
ed States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.52 In 2011, in Johnson v. 
Whitehead, the Fourth Circuit held that a Jamaican-born plaintiff claiming 
U.S. citizenship was barred from bringing a habeas petition challenging his 
removal order on that basis because he had failed to exhaust available admin-
istrative remedies.53 The plaintiff’s prior removal proceedings had been ter-
minated by an immigration judge, who stated that he appeared to be a U.S. 
citizen.54 The plaintiff then filed a N-600 Application for Certificate of Citi-
zenship, which was rejected and never appealed.55 Relying on two statutes to 
justify its dismissal, the court first held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) prohibits 
                                                                                                                           
 46 Moussa, 302 F.3d at 824–25, 827. 
 47 Omolo, 452 F.3d at 407. 
 48 Id. at 406–07. 
 49 Id. at 407. The court ultimately found that the plaintiff did not have a valid claim to U.S. 
citizenship. Id. at 409. 
 50 Poole, 522 F.3d at 261, 264. 
 51 Id. at 264 (quoting Ng Fung Ho, 259 U.S. at 284) (“An assertion of United States ‘citizen-
ship is . . . a denial of an essential jurisdictional fact’ in a deportation proceeding.”). 
 52 See generally Johnson, 647 F.3d 120 (holding the plaintiff’s citizenship claim was barred 
because he had failed to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a habeas petition in federal 
court). 
 53 Id. at 123, 125. The plaintiff relied on former 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3) and asserted U.S. citi-
zenship on the basis of his father’s naturalization. Id. at 123 (stating “‘[t]he naturalization of the 
parent having legal custody of the child when there has been a legal separation of the parents’ 
conferred citizenship on that child” under former 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3)). 
 54 Id. at 123–24, 130 (first citing Barnes v. Holder, 625 F.3d 801, 805–06 (4th Cir. 2010); and 
then citing Acosta Hidalgo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 103, 108 (B.I.A. 2007)) (pointing out that immigration 
judges and the BIA do not have the authority to confer citizenship). 
 55 Id. at 125. The plaintiff could not demonstrate that his parents had legally separated be-
cause they had never married. Id. at 123–24. 
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the use of habeas corpus petitions as a means of obtaining review of issues 
that arise in removal proceedings, including questions of citizenship.56 Sec-
ond, the court concluded that 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) barred the plaintiff’s habeas 
petition because it requires a final administrative denial before a plaintiff can 
institute an action claiming U.S. citizenship.57 
B. The Tenth Circuit Examines the Exhaustion Issue 
The Tenth Circuit had not ruled on the precise issue of whether an indi-
vidual in removal proceedings claiming U.S. citizenship must exhaust admin-
istrative remedies until it decided Gonzalez-Alarcon in 2018.58 Born in the 
border city of Ciudad Juárez, Mexico, Abraham Gonzalez-Alarcon (“Gonza-
lez-Alarcon”) entered the United States as a child in 2005 and was subse-
quently removed several times.59 In 2015, immigration authorities once again 
found Gonzalez-Alarcon in the United States, took him into federal custody, 
charged him with illegal reentry, and reinstated his removal order.60 
Gonzalez-Alarcon eventually realized he could claim citizenship based 
on his mother, who was a U.S. citizen by virtue of being born in New Mexi-
co.61 As a result, he filed a habeas petition in the United States District Court 
for the District of New Mexico seeking release from Immigration and Cus-
                                                                                                                           
 56 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (“[N]o court shall have jurisdiction, by habeas corpus . . . to review 
such an order or such questions of law or fact.”); Johnson, 647 F.3d at 124–25. Because the plain-
tiff’s citizenship claim arose in his removal proceedings, the court reasoned that a petition for 
review, not his habeas petition, was the proper avenue to seek redress. Johnson, 647 F.3d at 124. 
 57 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (2018) (mandating that an action to declare U.S. citizenship “may be 
instituted only within five years after the final administrative denial of such right or privilege” and 
also asserting that an individual cannot bring a habeas petition claiming U.S. citizenship if such a 
claim arose in connection with removal proceedings); Johnson, 647 F.3d at 125. But see Ortega-
Morales v. Lynch, 168 F. Supp. 3d 1228, 1238 (D. Ariz. 2016) (deeming the Fourth Circuit’s 
statement that § 1503(a) requires exhaustion dictum and unnecessary to court’s conclusion). 
 58 Gonzalez-Alarcon, 884 F.3d at 1272. 
 59 Id. at 1269; Gonzalez Alarcon, 2016 WL 9777258, at *1. Gonzalez-Alarcon was ordered 
removed in 2012, and after he reentered the United States, his order of removal was reinstated in 
2013. Gonzalez-Alarcon, 884 F.3d at 1269. 
 60 Gonzalez-Alarcon, 884 F.3d at 1269. Gonzalez-Alarcon’s prior removal order was reinstat-
ed under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2018). Id. at 1270. When a prior removal order is reinstated, it is 
reinstated from its original date and cannot be reviewed or reopened. Id. An immigration officer 
can reinstate a prior removal order upon finding that (1) the noncitizen received a prior removal 
order, (2) the noncitizen was previously removed or departed voluntarily while subject to a re-
moval order, and (3) the noncitizen reentered the United States illegally. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. 
§ 241.8(a) (2018)). For more information on the practice of reinstating prior orders of removal, 
including controversies surrounding the practice, see Gavin, supra note 23, at 2451–62. 
 61 Gonzalez-Alarcon, 884 F.3d at 1269 (under 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c), “[a] child born abroad to 
an unwed, citizen mother is a citizen if the mother lived in the United States for at least one year 
prior to the child’s birth”). 
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toms Enforcement (ICE) custody.62 The district court dismissed Gonzalez-
Alarcon’s habeas petition on two grounds.63 First, the court reasoned that 
Gonzalez-Alarcon had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because 
he did not file a N-600 Application for Certificate of Citizenship before seek-
ing habeas relief.64 Second, the district court determined that it lacked juris-
diction to review Gonzalez-Alarcon’s habeas petition under the REAL ID 
Act.65 Gonzalez-Alarcon appealed to the Tenth Circuit.66 That appeal enabled 
the Tenth Circuit to address the question of whether a person facing removal 
must exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a non-frivolous claim 
of U.S. citizenship in district court.67 
The Tenth Circuit concluded that the provision at issue does not require 
a plausible U.S. citizenship claim to be exhausted prior to judicial review.68 
Mirroring Minasyan and Moussa, the court interpreted § 1252(d) as applying 
only to “aliens” and thus not governing individuals with a plausible U.S. citi-
zenship claim.69 The court further held that because district courts have juris-
diction to determine their own jurisdiction, a court must first determine a peti-
tioner’s citizenship before requiring exhaustion.70 Additionally, the court con-
cluded that, despite Gonzalez-Alarcon’s central aim of release from detention, 
he was nonetheless seeking “judicial review of an order of removal,” which 
was barred by § 1252(b)(1) after the thirty-day deadline passed.71 
                                                                                                                           
 62 Id. at 1268; Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 1, Gonzalez Alarcon, 2016 WL 
9777258 (No. 15-00910). Habeas review is available only to those in custody. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241(c); see César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 
UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1409 (2014) (explaining that in the context of federal habeas relief, “custo-
dy” requires a deprivation of liberty but is not limited to physical confinement or detention). In 
this case, the district court determined and the appeals court agreed that Gonzalez-Alarcon was in 
custody for habeas purposes because an ICE order restricted him from traveling outside the ICE 
Oklahoma City sub-office boundaries without approval and required him to report to immigration 
officers periodically. Gonzalez-Alarcon, 884 F.3d at 1270; Gonzalez Alarcon, 2016 WL 9777258, 
at *2. 
 63 Gonzalez Alarcon, 2016 WL 9777258, at *9, *11. 
 64 Id. at *9. 
 65 Id. at *11. 
 66 Gonzalez-Alarcon, 884 F.3d at 1266. 
 67 Id. at 1272. 
 68 Id. at 1273. 
 69 Id. at 1268; Minasyan, 401 F.3d at 1075; Moussa, 302 F.3d at 825. 
 70 Gonzalez-Alarcon, 884 F.3d at 1273. 
 71 Id. at 1275. The court reasoned that although the aim of Gonzalez-Alarcon’s petition was to 
secure release from detention, his pending removal order was the sole basis for ICE’s ongoing 
supervision of him. Id. A petition for review of a removal order must be filed within thirty days of 
a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). This thirty-day deadline is “mandatory and juris-
dictional; it is not subject to equitable tolling.” Gonzalez-Alarcon, 884 F.3d at 1271. 
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The court acknowledged that barring habeas review of citizenship 
claims raises a serious Suspension Clause issue.72 Declining to address this 
constitutional issue, the court instead concluded that Gonzalez-Alarcon 
should first attempt to obtain review through the petition for review process 
under the REAL ID Act.73 For Gonzalez-Alarcon, the court noted, the appro-
priate appeals court in which to file a petition for review was the Fifth Circuit, 
where his original removal proceedings occurred.74 If the BIA denied Gonza-
lez-Alarcon’s motion to reopen, he could thus appeal the denial in a petition 
for review to the Fifth Circuit; however, the Tenth Circuit expressed concern 
that its interpretation of the REAL ID Act would not be binding in the Fifth 
Circuit.75 
II. THE TENTH CIRCUIT JOINS THE MAJORITY AND ALLOWS  
INDIVIDUALS CLAIMING U.S. CITIZENSHIP TO BRING THE  
CLAIM IN FEDERAL COURT PRIOR TO EXHAUSTION  
In Gonzalez-Alarcon v. Macias, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit made an exception to the exhaustion provision of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(d) for non-frivolous claims to U.S. citizenship.76 The court’s decision 
echoed the concern of many of its sister courts that such a significant claim 
could be suppressed by a procedural bar.77 Section A of this Part describes the 
Tenth Circuit’s reasoning in further detail.78 Section B explains the contrast 
between the reasoning of the majority of circuits that have determined this 
issue and that of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.79 
A. The Tenth Circuit’s Reasoning Resolves a Critical Legal Issue  
but Leaves Gonzalez-Alarcon’s Fate Unknown 
Although the Tenth Circuit had not yet addressed the precise issue at the 
crux of Gonzalez-Alarcon’s case, it relied in part on one of its prior holdings 
                                                                                                                           
 72 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”); 
Gonzalez-Alarcon, 884 F.3d at 1275, 1277 (“The REAL ID Act does not contain any explicit 
safety valve under which an individual could obtain review of a reinstated order of removal that 
was not presented in a timely petition for review . . . . In the context of a citizenship claim, the 
lack of a failsafe provision is troubling.”). 
 73 Gonzalez-Alarcon, 884 F.3d at 1277–78. 
 74 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2); Gonzalez-Alarcon, 884 F.3d at 1269. 
 75 Gonzalez-Alarcon, 884 F.3d at 1277–79. 
 76 Gonzalez-Alarcon v. Macias, 884 F.3d 1266, 1272 (10th Cir. 2018). 
 77 Id.; see, e.g., Minasyan v. Gonzales, 401 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that if 
exhaustion were required, it would be possible to “unintentionally relinquish U.S. citizenship”). 
 78 See infra notes 80–97 and accompanying text. 
 79 See infra notes 98–107 and accompanying text. 
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to inform its decision in that case.80 In 2012, in Shepherd v. Holder, the court 
had held that in removal proceedings, citizenship serves as the denial of an 
essential jurisdictional fact because only noncitizens are removable.81 Further, 
it had determined that in assessing jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 gener-
ally, the court had authority to determine if the factual conditions for the ju-
risdictional bar were present.82 Extending Shepherd’s reasoning in Gonzalez-
Alarcon, the Tenth Circuit concluded that § 1252(d) does not require exhaus-
tion of a citizenship claim before a court can determine the jurisdictional facts 
relevant to that statute’s particular jurisdictional bar, including the petitioner’s 
citizenship.83 
Further, although the Tenth Circuit held that the exhaustion provision 
of § 1252(d) applies only to “aliens,” it determined that the statute as a 
whole could not be interpreted as such.84 For example, the court noted that 
§ 1252(a)(5) does not contain the word “alien,” and thus interpreted that sub-
section to apply to petitioners regardless of their citizenship.85 As a result, the 
court reasoned that § 1252(a)(5) bars habeas challenges to removal orders for 
both alien petitioners and those claiming U.S. citizenship.86 Thus, the court 
concluded that the REAL ID Act bars habeas review of Gonzalez-Alarcon’s 
claim and implicates Suspension Clause issues.87 Adhering to the canon of 
constitutional avoidance, the Tenth Circuit deferred analysis of whether Con-
gress indeed has the authority to prevent such review and instead offered an 
uncertain course for Gonzalez-Alarcon.88 
                                                                                                                           
 80 Gonzalez-Alarcon, 884 F.3d at 1272; see Shepherd v. Holder, 678 F.3d 1171, 1175, 1185 
(10th Cir. 2012) (determining that an Indian-born plaintiff in removal proceedings failed to meet 
the statutory requirements for citizenship under the Child Citizenship Act of 2000 and thus was 
not a U.S. citizen). 
 81 Shepherd, 678 F.3d at 1175. 
 82 Id. at 1180 (acknowledging Congress’s plenary power with respect to immigration policy, 
the court noted “Congress may limit federal court jurisdiction through provisions such as the 
§ 1252(a)(2)(C) bar, but courts have authority to determine whether the factual conditions for the 
bar are present”). In that case, the court did not settle the issue of whether the exhaustion require-
ment applied to U.S. citizens because it concluded that petitioner was not a citizen and thus dis-
missed her petition for review on that basis. Id. at 1184. 
 83 Gonzalez-Alarcon, 884 F.3d at 1272; Shepherd, 678 F.3d at 1179–80. 
 84 Gonzalez-Alarcon, 884 F.3d at 1273–74. 
 85 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (2018) (“[A] petition for review filed with an appropriate court of 
appeals in accordance with this section shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of 
an order of removal entered or issued under any provision of this Act . . . .”); Gonzalez-Alarcon, 
884 F.3d at 1274. 
 86 Gonzalez-Alarcon, 884 F.3d at 1274. 
 87 Id. at 1275. 
 88 Id.; see Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COL-
UM. L. REV. 1189, 1192 & n.8 (2006) (explaining that the canon of constitutional avoidance pro-
vides that “where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitu-
tional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such a construc-
tion is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress”); see also Clark v. Suarez Martinez, 543 U.S. 
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The Tenth Circuit proposed that Gonzalez-Alarcon raise his citizenship 
claim in a petition for review following the denial of a motion to reopen is-
sued by an immigration judge.89 Iterating the enormous importance of the 
writ of habeas corpus in protecting against executive detention, the Tenth Cir-
cuit nonetheless noted that an adequate substitute may provide sufficient re-
lief under the Constitution where a habeas petition cannot be filed.90 In Gon-
zalez-Alarcon’s case, the court noted, a petition for review of his citizenship 
claim would surely provide an adequate substitute.91 The court held that it 
would not hear Gonzalez-Alarcon’s habeas petition unless he is denied re-
view through this proposed process.92 The availability of this option in the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, where the peti-
tion for review deadline has passed, is not entirely clear.93 
Although the Tenth Circuit cannot issue a REAL ID Act interpretation 
that is binding in the Fifth Circuit, it noted that in 2013 in Iracheta v. Holder, 
the Fifth Circuit confirmed its own jurisdiction to review a nationality claim 
in the context of a reinstated order of removal.94 Further, the Tenth Circuit 
cited two cases from sister circuits that provide a roadmap for review of an 
untimely motion.95 In those cases, Iasu v. Smith and Luna v. Holder, however, 
                                                                                                                           
371, 385 (2005) (explaining that in cases where a statute is found to have more than one construc-
tion after ordinary textual analysis, the canon of constitutional avoidance serves as a means of 
choosing between the textual interpretations). 
 89 Gonzalez-Alarcon, 884 F.3d at 1271, 1275 (explaining that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) prohibits 
an immigration judge from granting a motion to reopen Gonzalez-Alarcon’s removal proceedings 
because it states that prior orders of removal are not subject to being reopened). 
 90 Id. at 1276 (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 
(2001)) (“At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the 
legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.”); 
see also Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381–82 (1977) (holding that a substitute remedy that 
offers a scope of review equal to that of a habeas remedy is adequate and effective). 
 91 Gonzalez-Alarcon, 884 F.3d at 1276. 
 92 Id. at 1275–76. 
 93 See id. at 1269, 1279 (explaining that “Gonzalez-Alarcon might be able to obtain review 
because the question cannot be directed to our court”). Unlike the courts in Omolo, Minasyan, and 
Moussa, the Tenth Circuit could not directly address the citizenship claim of its petitioner because 
Gonzalez-Alarcon’s original removal proceedings occurred in the Fifth Circuit. See Omolo v. Gon-
zales, 452 F.3d 404, 407 (5th Cir. 2006) (original removal proceedings occurred in the circuit 
reviewing the citizenship claim); Minasyan, 401 F.3d at 1074–75 (same); Moussa v. Immigration 
& Naturalization Serv., 302 F.3d 823, 827 (8th Cir. 2002) (same). 
 94 See Gonzalez-Alarcon, 884 F.3d at 1279 (quoting Iracheta v. Holder, 730 F.3d 419, 422 
(5th Cir. 2013)) (“Such review [of a petitioner’s nationality claim] is proper because whether a 
petitioner ‘is actually an alien is a jurisdictional fact in a removal or reinstatement proceeding.’”). 
In Iracheta, the Fifth Circuit considered the citizenship of a Mexican-born petitioner facing rein-
statement of a previously issued removal order. 730 F.3d at 421, 427. There, the court held that its 
jurisdiction to review petitioner’s claim was not barred by the fact that immigration authorities had 
previously rejected it. Id. at 422. 
 95 Gonzalez-Alarcon, 884 F.3d at 1278 (first citing Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d 85, 87 (2d Cir. 
2011); and then citing Iasu v. Smith, 511 F.3d 881, 892–93 (9th Cir. 2007)). In Luna, the Second 
Circuit held that petitioners who were prevented from filing timely motions for review indeed 
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the petitioners had not been previously removed and had raised their claims in 
the appropriate appeals courts where their original removal proceedings oc-
curred.96 Thus, despite the Tenth Circuit’s persuasive guidance, Gonzalez-
Alarcon’s particular circumstance would pose a novel issue to the Fifth Cir-
cuit, if the case indeed reaches that stage.97 
B. Individual Rights in Tension with Plenary Power 
Underlying the circuit split on this issue is a tension between the estab-
lished plenary power in the realm of immigration and the role of the judicial 
branch to intervene to protect individual rights.98 The Fourth Circuit’s deci-
sion in Johnson v. Whitehead reinforced Congress’s plenary power and a lim-
ited judicial reach in immigration matters, and it avoided substantive mention 
of the sanctity of citizenship.99 In contrast, several of the sister courts that the 
Tenth Circuit joined on this issue espouse greater skepticism toward the su-
premacy of plenary power where a detainee’s citizenship is in question.100 
Indeed, the collective concerns of the majority of the addressing courts spring 
from a fraught history of evolving U.S. immigration law, over the course of 
which the security of one’s citizenship has fluctuated with the political 
tides.101 
                                                                                                                           
raised Suspension Clause issues; however, the statutory motion to reopen process could provide a 
sufficient alternative to a habeas petition. 637 F.3d at 87. In Iasu, the Ninth Circuit rejected a 
Suspension Clause claim based on citizenship where petitioner could file an untimely motion to 
reopen under the REAL ID Act. 511 F.3d at 892–93. There, the court reasoned that even if the 
immigration judge and the BIA rejected petitioner’s untimely motion, he could still appeal the 
jurisdictional issue directly with an appeals court. Id. 
 96 Gonzalez-Alarcon, 884 F.3d at 1278; Luna, 637 F.3d at 87; Iasu, 511 F.3d at 892–93. 
 97 Gonzalez-Alarcon, 884 F.3d at 1279. 
 98 Johnson v. Whitehead, 647 F.3d 120, 125 (4th Cir. 2011); Poole v. Mukasey, 522 F.3d 259, 
264 (2d Cir. 2008); Omolo, 452 F.3d at 406–07; Theagene v. Gonzales, 411 F.3d 1107, 1110 & 
n.4 (9th Cir. 2005); Minasyan, 401 F.3d at 1074–76; Moussa, 302 F.3d at 824–25, 827; see supra 
notes 40–57 and accompanying text (presenting the current circuit split on the exhaustion re-
quirement for citizenship claims in removal proceedings). 
 99 Johnson, 647 F.3d at 126 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977)) (“The Supreme 
Court has emphasized Congress’s plenary power over immigration and naturalization . . . ‘the 
power over aliens is of a political character and therefore subject only to narrow judicial re-
view.’”). Johnson delved into the petitioner’s criminal record, involving gun and drug offenses, 
noting that “[r]emoval of aliens who commit serious crimes is a central aim of the INA.” Id. at 
131. The court offered just one sentence to iterate the importance of protecting citizenship, stating 
that Johnson’s U.S. citizenship claim “is of central importance, because if Johnson ever was a 
citizen, his criminal acts would not strip him of citizenship and DHS would be unable to remove 
him.” Id. at 125. 
 100 See, e.g., Poole, 522 F.3d at 264 (“The executive branch may remove certain aliens but has 
no authority to remove citizens.”); Minasyan, 401 F.3d at 1075 (reaching the same conclusion). 
 101 See, e.g., United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161, 170 (1904) (dismissing a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus on behalf of several people of Chinese descent claiming U.S. citizenship 
because petitioners had failed to appeal the immigration inspector’s decision not to admit them via 
the applicable statutory appeal provision). In that case, Justice Holmes justified his decision with a 
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For example, both the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Minasyan v. Gonzales and the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit in Poole v. Mukasey cited Ng Fung Ho v. White, which assert-
ed the right to judicial determination of U.S. citizenship claims in the wake of 
years of historical discrimination against Chinese immigrants in America.102 
Ng Fung Ho and other contemporaneous cases regarding Chinese exclusion 
marked a shift in the Court’s interpretation of the role of the judiciary in im-
migration matters.103 Citing due process concerns, the Supreme Court in Ng 
Fung Ho warned of the risk of a deprivation of liberty if individuals claiming 
U.S. citizenship were not afforded judicial review.104 Despite the Court’s ef-
forts in the 1920s to bolster safeguards to protect citizenship, in the following 
decades the Court continued to vacillate between asserting the supremacy of 
congressional power and protecting the sanctity of citizenship.105 
Almost a century later, the full extent of Congress’s plenary power in the 
realm of immigration remains unresolved and deeply influenced by the politi-
cal climate.106 As of 2019, individuals like Gonzalez-Alarcon, who are for-
eign-born and claiming U.S. citizenship, thus face an uncertain future.107 
                                                                                                                           
procedural argument by asserting, “it is one of the necessities of the administration of justice that 
even fundamental questions should be determined in an orderly way.” Id. at 168. In a vigorous 
dissent, Justice Brewer exposed an insidious racial component lurking beneath the Court’s deci-
sion. Id. at 178 (Brewer, J., dissenting) (pointing out unjust discrepancy between immigration 
enforcement against American-born U.S. citizens of Chinese descent and those of Anglo-Saxon 
descent). 
 102 Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 276 (1922); Poole, 522 F.3d at 264; Minasyan, 401 
F.3d at 1075. 
 103 Compare Ng Fung Ho, 259 U.S. at 285 (holding individuals detained by immigration 
authorities “entitled to a judicial determination of their claims that they are citizens of the United 
States”), and Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454, 464 (1920) (“It is better that many Chinese 
immigrants should be improperly admitted than that one natural-born citizen of the United States 
should be permanently excluded from his country.”), with United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 
258, 263–64 (1905) (granting the Secretary of Commerce authority to make final determination on 
admissibility of petitioner claiming to be a native-born U.S. citizen and finding no violation of due 
process in denying judicial appeal of such determination). 
 104 Ng Fung Ho, 259 U.S. at 284–85. 
 105 See, e.g., Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 61–62 (1958), overruled in part by Afroyim v. 
Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967). In Perez, the Court affirmed petitioner’s loss of U.S. citizenship be-
cause of his involvement in Mexican political affairs, holding that denationalization was necessary 
to avoid embarrassment to the U.S. government. Id. (clarifying the Court’s stance with respect to 
involuntary renunciation of citizenship stating “it would be a mockery of this Court’s decisions to 
suggest that a person, in order to lose his citizenship, must intend or desire to do so”). Less than a 
decade later, the Court overruled Perez in Afroyim v. Rusk and asserted a more secure notion of 
citizenship that cannot be involuntarily relinquished. Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 262. The Court stated, 
“There is no indication in [the words of the Fourteenth Amendment] of a fleeting citizenship, good 
at the moment it is acquired but subject to destruction by the Government at any time.” Id. 
 106 See, e.g., Sieff, supra note 1 (reporting that immigration authorities in the Trump admin-
istration are denying passports to Hispanic individuals with official U.S. birth certificates). 
 107 See, e.g., Eyder Peralta, You Say You’re an American, but What if You Had to Prove It or Be 
Deported?, NPR (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/12/22/504031635/
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III. THE TENTH CIRCUIT PAVES A PIVOTAL PATH  
FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP CLAIMS 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in 
Gonzalez-Alarcon v. Macias reflects an instinctual aversion to the notion that 
the government is wrongfully detaining and possibly deporting U.S. citi-
zens.108 With its decision to join the majority of circuits in holding that the 
REAL ID Act’s exhaustion provision does not apply to a U.S. citizenship 
claim by an individual facing removal, the Tenth Circuit correctly interpreted 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(d).109 Although the requirement of administrative exhaustion 
before judicial intervention is logical and necessary in many aspects of immi-
gration and administrative law, U.S. citizenship claims should not be sup-
pressed or unduly delayed for the sake of procedural order.110 The Tenth Cir-
cuit’s decision chips away at the likelihood that U.S. citizens will be wrong-
fully detained or deported through a complex and often discretionary admin-
istrative process.111 By legally recognizing this statutory safeguard and 
providing quicker access to judicial review by tenured, Article III judges, the 
Tenth Circuit moved to protect those most vulnerable to being mistaken as 
noncitizens by immigration authorities.112 
                                                                                                                           
you-say-you-re-an-american-but-what-if-you-had-to-prove-it-or-be-deported#text1 [https://perma.
cc/Q5W4-3R4D] (revealing ICE’s wrongful detention of Lorenzo Palma, an American citizen 
born in Gonzalez-Alarcon’s hometown of Ciudád Juarez, Mexico). 
 108 See Gonzalez-Alarcon v. Macias, 884 F.3d 1266, 1277 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Perez v. 
Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)) (noting that “[c]itizenship is unique; 
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4, at 611–12 (“[T]he mistaken deprivation of citizenship rights effects a legal death, the political 
equivalent of an execution or wrongful death at the hands of the police.”). 
 109 See Gonzalez-Alarcon, 884 F.3d at 1273 (holding that “if a petitioner advances a plausible 
claim to citizenship, the district court possesses jurisdiction to determine whether § 1252(d)(1) 
applies”). 
 110 See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 4, at 1031 (explaining that the exhaustion rule, as a 
traditional prerequisite to judicial review, permits agencies to perform fact development, apply the 
specific law at which they are expert, and engage in self-correction); Shruti Rana, “Streamlining” 
the Rule of Law: How the Department of Justice Is Undermining Judicial Review of Agency Ac-
tion, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 829, 836 (arguing that an instrumentalist approach in the immigration 
context prioritizes efficient results over adherence to “standards, precedents, and legal princi-
ples”). 
 111 See Gonzalez-Alarcon, 884 F.3d at 1272 (noting that if the law required citizenship claims 
to be exhausted, an individual could involuntarily relinquish his or her citizenship); see, e.g., Do-
monoske, supra note 15 (recounting the nearly three-and-a-half-year detention of Davino Watson, 
a Jamaican-born U.S. citizen whose claims were repeatedly ignored by ICE). The Director of the 
Heartland Alliance National Immigrant Justice Center, Mary Meg McCarthy, posited that Wat-
son’s case dragged on precisely because he continued to assert his U.S. citizenship, which led to 
various organizations and people becoming involved. Domonoske, supra note 15. 
 112 See Paige St. John & Joel Rubin, ICE Held an American Man in Custody for 1,273 days. 
He’s Not the Only One Who Had to Prove His Citizenship, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2018), http://www.
latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-citizens-ice-20180427-htmlstory.html# [https://perma.cc/W9RR-
UFH8] (reporting that the two groups most vulnerable to being mistaken as noncitizens are for-
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Although the Tenth Circuit did not resolve the Suspension Clause issue 
posed by the REAL ID Act’s bar of Gonzalez-Alarcon’s habeas claim, Judge 
Lucero added a concurrence to his own majority opinion to reinforce the im-
portance of the Great Writ in rectifying procedural errors that could impinge 
upon constitutional rights.113 Judge Lucero’s concurrence and the Tenth Cir-
cuit’s decision call for a fortification of procedural safeguards to protect U.S. 
citizens from wrongful detention and deportation, which some courts and 
scholars have equated with criminal punishment.114 In fact, Judge Lucero 
drew an explicit parallel between an assertion of innocence in response to a 
criminal conviction and a citizenship claim in the context of immigration de-
tention.115 Indeed, where detainees facing removal are routinely housed in 
correctional facilities, and where the consequences of deportation often in-
volve loss of life and liberty, Judge Lucero does not stretch this metaphor.116 
Despite the U.S. legal system’s unwillingness to formally classify immi-
gration detention and deportation as criminal punishment, due process in a 
civil proceeding nonetheless includes the right to be heard before being de-
                                                                                                                           
eign-born citizens and the children of immigrants); see also Rachel E. Rosenbloom, From the Out-
side Looking in: U.S. Passports in the Borderlands, in CITIZENSHIP IN QUESTION: EVIDENTIARY 
BIRTHRIGHT AND STATELESSNESS, supra note 5, at 132, 142 (explaining that from 1980 to 2003, 
federal spending on border enforcement has grown twenty-fold, and as a result, the status of citi-
zens living at U.S. borders is questioned more frequently). 
 113 Gonzalez-Alarcon, 884 F.3d at 1282 (Lucero, J., concurring) (“The Great Writ, as protect-
ed by the Suspension Clause, necessarily includes the power to excuse procedural errors to cure a 
miscarriage of justice.”). 
 114 See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 357 (2010) (“Although removal proceedings 
are civil, deportation is intimately related to the criminal process . . . .”); Daniel Kanstroom, De-
portation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad 
Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1889, 1893–94, 1935 (2000) (arguing that deportation—specifically of 
long-term permanent residents for post-entry criminal conduct—should be considered punishment 
because it incapacitates, deters, and operates as a form of retribution); Anita Ortiz Maddali, Pa-
dilla v. Kentucky: A New Chapter in Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Whether Deportation Con-
stitutes Punishment for Lawful Permanent Residents?, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 23–24 (2011) (argu-
ing in the wake of Padilla v. Kentucky that the deportation of lawful permanent residents for crim-
inal convictions does not serve merely a regulatory purpose, but instead constitutes punishment); 
Markowitz, supra note 2, at 294–95 (“The deprivation of liberty from a criminal conviction can 
pale in comparison to the liberty interest at stake in the removal proceeding that the conviction 
triggers.”). 
 115 Gonzalez-Alarcon, 884 F.3d at 1285 (Lucero, J., concurring) (“[I]f we analogize the find-
ing that Gonzalez-Alarcon is removable to a state court conviction, his plausible allegation of 
citizenship would show that he is not removable in the same way that a state prisoner might show 
he did not commit the crime of conviction.”). 
 116 See Markowitz, supra note 35, at 1301–02 (explaining that immigrants in deportation pro-
ceedings can face not only “life sentences of banishment from their homes, families, and livelihoods 
in the United States” but also “serious persecution or death.”); Dagmar R. Myslinska, Living Condi-
tions in Immigration Detention Centers, NOLO (2018), https://www.nolo.com/legal-
encyclopedia/living-conditions-immigration-detention-centers.html [https://perma.cc/2S43-6TZF] 
(noting that immigration detention centers not only resemble prisons, but they are often contained 
in correctional facilities). 
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ported.117 In practice, however, an individual with a final removal order may 
well be deported before an appeal is fully resolved by a federal court.118 Alt-
hough noncitizens have the right to file a stay of removal, in many cases this 
determination is left to the discretion of an immigration judge or the BIA.119 
An appeals court, however, can issue a judicial stay of removal while the BIA 
or federal court adjudicates the petitioner’s claim.120 Thus, by providing an 
avenue for judicial review of U.S. citizenship claims, the Tenth Circuit pro-
vides an added layer of protection for citizens at risk of discretionary deporta-
tion by the executive branch.121 
Writing more liberally in his concurrence, Judge Lucero calls for an 
analysis of Gonzalez-Alarcon’s Suspension Clause challenge with respect to 
the REAL ID Act’s ability to grant him relief.122 Deflecting this issue to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for now, the Tenth Circuit 
nonetheless contributes to the evolution of an immigration system that, as a 
whole, has grown wary of the government’s capacity to revoke U.S. citizen-
ship, intentionally or not.123 By joining the majority, the Tenth Circuit cuts 
against the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s assertion 
                                                                                                                           
 117 See Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903) (holding that administrative officers 
executing statutory provisions involving individual liberty cannot disregard due process, including 
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 119 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS PRACTICE MANUAL 
§ 4.2(c) [hereinafter BIA PRACTICE MANUAL] (“An alien may seek a stay of deportation or stay of 
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 120 REALMUTO ET AL., supra note 118, at 1; see Devitri v. Cronen, 289 F. Supp. 3d 287, 289, 
298–99 (D. Mass. 2018) (granting preliminary injunction to fifty Indonesian Christians with final 
removal orders to prevent their possible removal until seven days after the BIA ruled on a timely 
motion to reopen, thereby providing petitioners a chance to seek a judicial stay of removal in the 
appeals court). 
 121 See BIA PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 119 (explaining that immigration judges and the 
BIA have discretion in some cases to grant or deny requests for a stay of removal). 
 122 Gonzalez-Alarcon, 884 F.3d at 1286. 
 123 See id. at 1277–78 (explaining that despite the court’s concern about the Suspension 
Clause argument, the court would not address this argument until Gonzalez-Alarcon undergoes the 
petition for review process); Nora Graham, Note, Patriot Act II and Denationalization: An Uncon-
stitutional Attempt to Revive Stripping Americans of Their Citizenship, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 593, 
601–05 (2004–2005) (detailing the history of the Supreme Court’s gradual recognition of uncon-
stitutionality of Congress revoking citizenship involuntarily). 
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of the supremacy of plenary power.124 Given the historical use of plenary 
power to justify racist immigration policies, the Tenth Circuit’s decision rep-
resents a small step toward reframing the American perception of others as 
less “alien” and more human.125 
CONCLUSION 
Each year, the U.S. government wrongly detains and seeks to remove a 
significant number of U.S. citizens. These grave errors stem from a number 
of sources, including racial bias, an overburdened administrative system, and 
a lack of procedural safeguards. Five circuits have now agreed that the REAL 
ID Act’s exhaustion provision does not apply to a U.S. citizenship claim by 
an individual facing removal. In Gonzalez-Alarcon v. Macias, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit joined the majority of circuit 
courts in this interpretation, carving out a judicial avenue for those in removal 
proceedings with non-frivolous U.S. citizenship claims. Although the deci-
sion does not settle the constitutional issue of a potentially suppressed habeas 
claim, it reasserts the importance of the Great Writ in protecting due process 
rights. The Tenth Circuit’s holding tightens the reins, if subtly, on a too-often 
unbridled plenary power. In so doing, the decision contributes momentum to 
efforts of policy-makers and advocates to preserve individual rights in our 
ever-evolving immigration system. 
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